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This article contends that the presence of a coactor leads to a focusing effect whenever this presence
represents a threat or a potential threat to self-evaluation. Experiment 1 showed that attentional focusing
appears in the presence of an actual (in the case of upward comparison) or potential (in the case of mere
coaction) threat to self-evaluation but not in its absence (in the case of downward comparison).
Experiments 2 and 3 confirmed that the presence of a coactor affects focusing because the coactor
represents a potential threat and showed that introducing a threat in downward comparison can produce
a focusing effect. Experiment 4 showed that removing the threat in upward comparison decreases the
focusing effect. Experiment 5 confirmed that the effects observed in upward comparison are due to
attentional focusing and not to an increase in effort. Contributions to social facilitation, social compar-
ison, and attention research are discussed.
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Attention implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal
effectively with others.—William James, The Principle of Psychology
When William James wrote the above citation, he used the terms
“in order to” presumably to refer to a conscious intentional atten-
tional strategy (a kind of attention now referred to as endogenous
attention; Briand, 1998). Individuals could, for instance, decide to
give more attention to cues that are central to the task at hand while
allocating less attention to cues that are related to the task but that
are only peripheral. However, in other situations, individuals do
not make a conscious choice to allocate less attention to peripheral
cues but still are faced with situational factors that require them to
deal with information not directly related to the task itself, which
leads to a withdrawal of attention from peripheral cues in order to
deal effectively with more central cues (Cohen, 1978). For the
distraction-conflict theory, the presence of a coactor is such a
situation (Baron, 1986; see also Geen, 1976; Muller, Atzeni, &
Butera, 2004). Indeed, the presence of a coactor often induces the
processing of information relative to her or his presence, informa-
tion that is not directly relevant to the task. Hence, in order to deal
with both the task and the additional information represented by
the coactor’s presence, an attentional focusing phenomenon oc-
curs: More attention is allocated to cues that are central for the task
at hand, while peripheral cues are neglected (Chajut & Algom,
2003; Cohen, 1978; Geen, 1976). An interesting consequence is
that this focusing of attention that is caused by the coactor’s
presence will benefit performance when central cues are needed
and peripheral cues are useless or disturb the information process-
ing. On the contrary, when peripheral cues are useful in addition to
central ones, performance will be impaired by the coactor’s pres-
ence. This dynamic is known in social psychology as the social
facilitation/inhibition (SFI) effect: The presence of a coactor some-
times facilitates and sometimes inhibits performance (Zajonc,
1965, 1980).
However, the above attentional view of the SFI effects is at odds
with Zajonc’s still dominant drive theory (Zajonc, 1965, 1980), a
behaviorist explanation that postulates that the presence of others
enhances a person’s level of drive. This drive level, in turn,
accentuates the hierarchy of the behavioral repertory and, by doing
so, reinforces the dominant response. This theory explains the
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circumstances in which coaction can enhance or impair perfor-
mance by demonstrating that for certain tasks (simple or well-
known tasks), dominant responses are the correct ones and that for
others (complex tasks), they are not. Zajonc’s theory has been very
influential and is at the origin of several explanations of SFI
effects, based on the notion of dominant responses (e.g., Baron,
1986, Model A; Cottrell, 1972). The first question addressed in the
present article is then what are the effects of a coactor’s presence?
Increase of attentional focusing or increase of the dominant re-
sponse?
The second important question is why a coactor’s presence
would consume attentional resources. According to Baron and
colleagues (Baron, Moore, & Sanders, 1978; Sanders, Baron, &
Moore, 1978), coactors are often sources of social comparison
information as people tend to evaluate their own performance. In
this article, we extend this idea and suggest that it is not the
coactor’s presence that is critical, but the threat to self-evaluation
he or she could represent. The reasoning behind this extension is
that concern about not reaching standards or goals, what we call
here self-evaluation threat, is known to consume attentional re-
sources in the form of ruminative thoughts (Koole, Smeets, van
Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999). Hence, the contribution of
the present article is to propose the general hypothesis that self-
evaluation threat induces attentional focusing. We support this
hypothesis with five experiments, showing that coaction leads to
attentional focusing whenever it represents an actual or potential
self-evaluation threat.1
The Focusing Effect of a Coactor’s Presence
One might suppose that there is nothing left to say about
coaction effects given the attention this question has received in
social psychology since Triplett’s (1898) seminal study over a
century ago, attention that has produced influential syntheses (e.g.,
Bond & Titus, 1983; Geen & Gange, 1977; Guerin, 1993). More-
over, Zajonc’s theory has been so influential that often it is still
taken for granted that a coactor’s presence increases dominant
responses. Nevertheless, recent publications addressing some of
the theoretical points relevant to the more general field of SFI
effects reveal that the debate is still alive and well (e.g., Huguet,
Galvaing, Monteil, & Dumas, 1999; Lambert et al., 2003; Muller
et al., 2004; Platania & Moran, 2001). More precisely, some of
these articles have provided interesting insights into the issue by
relying on tasks that are well-known in cognitive psychology and
that could be used to demonstrate that coaction leads to attentional
focusing (Huguet et al., 1999; Muller et al., 2004).
When Baron (1986) suggested that the presence of a coactor
should facilitate performance if attentional focusing favors the
correct response, he proposed that a critical test of the theory
would be to use a task in which the dominant response is incorrect,
but only central cues are needed to solve the task. If coaction
enhances performance, then the dominant response cannot be
invoked as the explanatory factor, while attentional focusing (con-
sidering only central cues) can. Baron suggested that the Stroop
task would be particularly appropriate for this purpose (Stroop,
1935; see also MacLeod, 1991, for a review). Several years later,
Huguet et al. (1999) showed, in line with this idea and Baron’s
theory, that the presence of a slightly superior coactor, as well as
the mere presence of an observer, led to a better performance (i.e.,
a lower Stroop interference) via a higher attentional focus on color,
compared with a control condition in which participants performed
alone. Attention usually devoted to peripheral cues, namely, the
meaning of the word, would be consumed by the information
processing relative to the coactor’s presence, leading to a more
efficient processing of central cues, namely, the color. However,
Huguet et al. (1999) explained these results in terms of a strategic
(conscious) inhibition of word reading, which is not essential to an
attentional explanation.
A Perceptual Task Revealing Attentional Focus
To provide a critical test of the attentional hypothesis, Muller et
al. (2004) used a perceptual task that does not rely on verbal
processes,
showing that the positive impact of mere coaction, as well as of
upward social comparison, can be found even when the task does not
rely upon a learned process (as in the Stroop task, cf. MacLeod, 1991)
and, most importantly, even when a systematic strategy cannot im-
prove performance. (p. 660)2
This task is a target detection task that was used by Treisman and
her colleagues to develop her features integration theory and to
illustrate what has been called the “illusory conjunction effect”
(Treisman, 1998; Treisman & Paterson, 1984; Treisman &
Schmidt, 1982). According to this theory, in the first stage of
visual perception, the perceptual system extracts—automatically
(without any attention required) and simultaneously (every char-
acteristic is processed at the same time)—the visual primitives,
that is, the simplest perceptual features of the object. The second
stage—in which attentional processing is needed—is the associa-
tion phase: Visual primitives are bound if they are parts of the
same object. Thus, illusory conjunction refers to the tendency to
think that a target object is present when in fact only its primitive
characteristics are displayed. For example, a leaning $ target
presented among distractors (e.g., vertical and horizontal bars) will
be considered as present when only its visual primitives—that is,
the leaning S and the leaning bar— are actually presented (very
briefly) but are combined in an illusory manner (Treisman &
Paterson, 1984). Here, the leaning bar and the leaning S are the
central cues for determining the target’s presence, while the dis-
tractors are peripheral cues. Treisman (1988) specified that the
target’s characteristics “are accurately located and conjoined only
when attention is narrowed to exclude the features of other objects
also present in the display” (p. 213). Thus, if coaction induces
higher attentional focusing (Baron, 1986), then only central cues—
and not peripheral—should receive attention, making illusory con-
junction less likely to occur. This is what Muller et al. (2004,
Experiment 1) found: Illusory conjunctions were less frequent
when participants were in the presence of a coactor than when they
1 It should be noted that, consistent with distraction-conflict theory,
other situational factors, such as noise, can induce attentional focusing (see
Chajut & Algom, 2003; and O’Malley & Poplawsky, 1971, for the effect
of noise on the Stroop interference).
2 In this article, we use the term mere coaction as Muller et al. (2004)
did: A situation in which the coactor is present but where no information
is provided about the relative status of participants and the coactor.
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were alone. Why, however, would a coactor consume attention and
thus induce attentional focusing?
The Focusing Effect of Self-Evaluation Threat
Baron and his colleagues (Baron et al., 1978; Sanders et al., 1978)
argued that dealing with the presence of a coactor consumes atten-
tional resources, notably because he or she is a source of social
comparison information. Or, in Sanders et al.’s (1978) words, “desire
for social comparison is a major reason why participants are distracted
by coactors” (p. 293). They tested this idea by showing that the
presence of a coactor had a beneficial impact on performance only
when he or she was working on the same task and not when he or she
was working on a different one (Sanders et al., 1978, Experiment 2).
In the present article, we argue that an integration of distraction-
conflict theory (Baron, 1986) and social comparison theory (Fest-
inger, 1954) can be particularly fruitful to understanding coaction
effects. From the social comparison literature, we know that a coac-
tor’s performance is a standard against which we often evaluate our
own performance (e.g., Bandura, 1986; Seta, Seta, & Donaldson,
1991). Thus, a threat to self-evaluation should appear when the drive
upward (Festinger, 1954) is not satisfied, that is, when the coactor is
superior (i.e., in upward comparison) or could potentially be superior
(i.e., when we have no information about his or her performance). In
regard to the latter case (i.e., a mere coaction), one could object that
the absence of information on the coactor’s performance could be
seen as an opportunity for stating one’s own superiority. Indeed,
research on social comparison has shown that people often declare
themselves better than the average person (e.g., Alicke, Klotz, Bre-
itenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995). However, Alicke et al.’s
(1995) results also showed that, when the comparison target is a
specific person, people do not assert their superiority. In fact, when
asked to evaluate the difference between themselves and a specific
comparison other, people even declare themselves inferior to the other
person.
In summary, if self-evaluation threat consumes attention (and thus
induces attentional focusing), then this should be true as long as
people are not reassured about their self-evaluation. Hence, a more
specific hypothesis is that enhancement of attentional focusing should
take place in mere coaction and in upward social comparison (USC)
but not in downward social comparison (DSC). Indeed, in DSC, no
focusing of attention should be found because participants are not
threatened in their self-evaluation since they have been reassured
about their superiority. The two experiments presented in Muller et al.
(2004) support this hypothesis. First, they found a lower rate of
conjunctive errors under USC than under DSC (see Huguet et al.,
1999, for conceptually similar results). Second, by comparing a mere
coaction condition, USC (with a coactor present) and DSC (also with
a coactor present), they showed that this effect was due to DSC
effectively reducing attentional focusing (as indicated by a higher
conjunctive error rate) as compared with the mere coaction condition.
However, USC only maintained the coaction effect because no dif-
ference was found between these conditions. The present article is
intended to provide the self-evaluation threat account that was lacking
in the Muller et al. (2004) article as well as to support the general
hypothesis that self-evaluation threat induces attentional focus.
In order to understand why self-evaluation threat would con-
sume attention and thus induce attentional focusing, self-
evaluation threat must be defined more precisely. The concept of
threat has recently become very popular in social psychology. One
way to conceive threat in the self-evaluation domain is to say that
a person would feel threatened whenever self-evaluation leads him
or her to the conscious or unconscious conclusion that his or her
performance does not fit with his or her standards (e.g., Tesser,
2000; see also Salovey, 1991). Actually, both Steele’s (1988)
self-affirmation theory and Tesser’s (1988) self-evaluation main-
tenance model propose that the need to reduce any discrepancy
between actual evaluation and standards would be a fundamental
one. In other words, positive evaluation may be a fundamental
need for human beings (Steele, 1988; Tesser, 1988; see also Beach
& Tesser, 2000; Tesser, 2000, 2001). This implies that, as far as
performance is concerned, threat is an expression of a lack of fit
between performance and standards that people have set for them-
selves (Tesser, 1988), whether consciously or not (Martin &
Tesser, 1996). We use the term self-evaluation threat to refer to
situations in which performance level is not high enough to reach
relevant standards used to evaluate performance.
What is the effect of this threat? If we rely on Martin and
Tesser’s (1996) model, we may suppose that this threat will lead to
ruminative thoughts (see Koole et al., 1999, for an experimental
test of this statement). Hence, for these authors, people under
self-evaluation threat will experience ruminative thoughts con-
cerning the existing discrepancy between their performance and
their standards. In our conceptualization, this rumination is a
situational constraint that would consume attention normally de-
voted to peripheral cues. Thus, it should create attentional focus-
ing. It is also worth noting that, given the importance of standards,
simply abandoning them may be very difficult (Steele, 1988;
Tesser, 1988). Accordingly, the most efficient way to stop these
ruminative thoughts would be to obtain reassurance about one’s
performance (Martin & Tesser, 1996).
These considerations lead us to extend distraction-conflict the-
ory (Baron, 1986) by arguing that the critical factor is not social
comparison in itself but the self-evaluation threat that this com-
parison represents. This would explain why the coaction effect is
not found in DSC (Huguet et al., 1999; Muller et al., 2004;
Rijsman, 1974; Seta, 1982). In this article, we argue and show that
the presence of a coactor leads to an enhancement of attentional
focusing as long as there is a threat, or a potential threat, to
self-evaluation.
Overview and Hypotheses
The general hypothesis of this article is that self-evaluation
threat leads to attentional focusing. Because our theoretical frame-
work is rooted in the SFI field, we test our general hypothesis in
the context of the coaction effect. We show that coaction leads to
attentional focusing whenever a coactor’s presence represents a
threat to self-evaluation. In the case of the paradigm used in the
first four studies, attentional focusing will correspond to a reduc-
tion in conjunctive errors (cf. Muller et al., 2004). In the case of the
paradigm used for the last experiment, attentional focusing will
correspond to a reduction in a cueing effect (which is presented
later).
Self-evaluation threat is expected to be high—and to produce
more attentional focusing than control conditions—whenever a
standard is activated and performance is, or may be, below this
standard. This will be true when performance is unsatisfying at the
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interpersonal level (lower than the coactor’s, regardless of his or
her physical presence), or at the normative level (lower than some
other relevant standards). In particular, the mere presence of a
coactor is a self-evaluation threat situation, as one’s own perfor-
mance may potentially be lower than the coactor’s. Conversely,
self-evaluation threat is expected to be low—and to produce the
same (lack of) attentional focusing as control conditions—as soon
as individuals are clearly reassured about their performance, that
is, when performance is satisfying compared with available stan-
dards of evaluation.
In Experiment 1, we tested the general assumption that self-
evaluation threat, or the possibility of a threat, entails attentional
focusing, which should produce a lower conjunctive error rate in the
task we used. We manipulated the physical presence of the coactor
(the coactor was either in the same cubicle or in another one) and
social comparison (USC, DSC, or without social comparison; WSC).
If, as we reasoned, self-evaluation threat is a critical factor, then being
inferior to a coactor (regardless of his or her physical presence) should
constitute such a self-evaluation threat and should thus induce atten-
tional focusing. As a consequence, a lower conjunctive error rate was
expected in both USC conditions. In addition, because mere coaction
represents a potential self-evaluation threat, this lower level of con-
junctive error rate should also appear even in the mere coaction
(WSC/coactor-present) condition. Both DSC conditions should pro-
duce the same level of conjunctive errors as the control condition
(WSC/coactor absent).
In Experiments 2, 3, and 4, we aimed to confirm and generalize the
interpretation in terms of self-evaluation threat by demonstrating that
self-evaluation threat can account for (a) the increased attentional
focusing in mere coaction, (b) the lowered attentional focusing in
DSC, and (c) the increased attentional focusing in USC, each of which
was found in Experiment 1. In particular, in Experiment 2, we tried to
provide a conceptual replication of these self-evaluation threat effects
by inducing a threat in reference to a normative standard that is not
directly linked to interpersonal comparison, namely, the midpoint of
an evaluation scale. The second aim of this experiment was to rein-
force the idea that the mere coaction effect is related to a potentially
unfavorable interpersonal comparison. In Experiment 3, results of
Experiments 1 and 2 were articulated to demonstrate that it is possible
to induce a self-evaluation threat, and, in turn, attentional focusing,
even in interpersonal DSC. Symmetrically, Experiment 4 aimed at
demonstrating that it is possible to decrease self-evaluation threat, and
thus attentional focusing, associated with interpersonal USC. The
results of all four studies converge to illustrate that the focusing effect
of coaction occurs when the coactor’s presence represents a self-
evaluation threat. In these four experiments, however, the attentional
focusing was potentially confounded with performance. Therefore, in
Experiment 5, we used a task that dissociates performance and atten-
tional focusing, with the aim of showing that self-evaluation threat
leads to attentional focusing and not to higher performance per se.
Experiment 1
The aim of this first experiment was to test the hypothesis that
self-evaluation threat, or potential self-evaluation threat, entails
attentional focusing, as indexed by a lower rate of conjunctive
errors. In this experiment, we manipulated the physical presence of
the coactor (the coactor was either in the same cubicle or in
another one) and the direction of comparison (USC, DSC, or
WSC). A lower conjunctive error rate was expected in mere
coaction (WSC/coactor present)—because of a potential self-
evaluation threat—and in both USC conditions (with and without
the physical presence of a coactor)—because of the explicit self-
evaluation threat. Both DSC conditions should provide reassuring
information about self-evaluation and thus produce the same level
of conjunctive errors as in the control condition (WSC/coactor
absent). No differences should be found among conditions in terms
of the rate of nonconjunctive errors (claiming that the target is not
present when in fact it is) because the literature has shown that
errors on these items is the result of the extraction of erroneous
features rather than of erroneous bindings (e.g., Treisman & Pater-
son, 1984). Given that Treisman’s (1998) theory suggests that
attention is only needed for correct bindings, no effect was ex-
pected on these items.
Method
Participants
Sixty-eight undergraduate students received extra course credit
for participation in what was presented as a visual perception
study. Five participants were dropped from the analysis: 3 because
they were suspicious about the feedback and 2 because they could
not remember their score or that of their coactor at the end of the
experiment. The mean participant age was 20 years (M  20.11,
SD  2.99). The majority of the participants were women (n 
52).3 All the participants had normal or corrected vision.
Experimental Design
This experiment took part in two experimental phases. There
were two between-participants variables. The first one concerned
both Phase 1 and Phase 2 and was introduced right after the
instructions at the beginning of the experiment (coaction: coactor
absent, coactor present): Half the participants were left alone in the
cubicle and half were in the physical presence of a coactor during
the entire experiment. The second variable was introduced via
bogus feedback during the break and right before the beginning of
Phase 2. This variable concerned the direction of social compari-
son (USC, DSC, and WSC). Participants were randomly assigned
to one of the six experimental conditions of this design.4
Materials
The stimuli used in this experiment were similar to those used
by Treisman and Paterson (1984). One hundred sixty items were
created, of which 80 were conjunctive items, and 80 were non-
conjunctive items. Items consisted of pictures, 9  9 cm in size,
and were displayed one at a time in the center of the computer
screen. Half of the items consisted of pictures with five vertical
bars, five straight angles and five Ss. We refer to these items as
conjunctive items, given that errors on these will be to see the
3 All the analyses presented in the present article have been rerun
without male participants. Although less powerful, the results remained the
same.
4 It is worth noting that the three coactor-present conditions correspond
to the three conditions reported in Muller et al.’s (2004) Experiment 2.
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target (i.e., the symbol $) when only its characteristics are present
(i.e., the S and the vertical bar). The other half of the items were
the same, but one of the Ss was replaced by a $ (the target; for
more details about materials, see Muller et al., 2004). We refer to
these items as nonconjunctive items, given that, here, errors will be
not to see the target when it is actually present. This perceptual
task was run on a PC computer with a Mitsubishi diamondtron
17-in. (43-cm) screen. The order of presentation of the items was
randomized by the software. Each item was displayed for 70 ms
after a fixation point of 1,000 ms. The duration of 70 ms was
chosen to promote illusory conjunctions. This duration has proved
to be too short to allow attentional processing of the entire pattern
of elements (cf. Treisman & Paterson, 1984). After each item, a
1,700-ms poststimulus mask was presented (a compound of ran-
dom letters), which served to eliminate retinal persistence.
At the end of the experiment, participants filled out a question-
naire. Among a number of descriptive questions, two concerned
the social comparison manipulation check: Participants were asked
to recall their alleged performance in the first phase as well as that
of the coactor.
Procedure
When participants registered for this experiment, they were told
that two people could participate at a time, each one in a cubicle.
In fact, only 1 real participant took part in the experiment because
the coactor was always a confederate. When participants arrived
for the experiment, basic task instructions were given to both the
participant and the confederate at the same time. This was not true
for the control condition (WSC/coactor absent), in which the
participant only met with the experimenter. The experimenter
explained to participants that their task was to decide whether the
symbol $ was present (by pressing on the P key) or absent (A key)
among a certain number of distractors. Participants were told to
make their response during the poststimulus mask. The instruc-
tions clearly specified that participants should try to make as few
errors as possible, rather than to go as quickly as possible.
Subsequently, participants in the coactor-present condition were
told that, for last-minute reasons, the second cubicle was no longer
available, so they would have to share a cubicle with the confed-
erate. Those in the coactor-absent condition received no such
information and were each installed in a different cubicle. In the
coactor-present condition, the experiment took place in a single
cubicle equipped with two computers, one across from the other.
Given that participants were face-to-face with the confederate, it
was impossible for them to see the coactor’s responses and screen.
In all conditions, the experimenter left the room during the exper-
iment and returned only for the break, which occurred between
Phases 1 and 2 (see below).
Participants initially performed four training trials and then
completed the first experimental phase. During this phase, 32
items (half conjunctive and half nonconjunctive items) were ran-
domly presented to participants. After these 32 items, a message
appeared on the screen and told participants that this phase was
over and that they should call the experimenter.
Then, a short break took place. This break was uneventful for
participants in the two WSC conditions, that is, the WSC/coactor
absent (control condition) and the WSC/coactor present (mere-
coaction condition). Therefore, in these two conditions, there was
no explicit social comparison. However, for both USC and DSC
conditions, the experimental induction of direction in social com-
parison was introduced during this break. In these four conditions
(two USC and two DSC), the experimenter told participants that
there would be a short break in order to process the results of the
first phase. The results had allegedly been processed by a central
computer, and the scores (both the participants’ and the confeder-
ate’s) appeared directly on the participants’ computer screen. In
the USC conditions, participants were allegedly inferior to the
coactor (scoring 65% of good responses, compared with 80% of
good responses for the coactor), whereas in the DSC conditions,
they were allegedly superior to the coactor (scoring 65% of good
responses, compared with 50% of good responses for the coactor).
After this bogus feedback, participants were required to perform
the second experimental phase. During this phase, 160 items (80
conjunctive and 80 nonconjunctive items) were presented in ran-
dom order. When this phase was over, participants filled out the
manipulation check questionnaire, were thoroughly debriefed,
thanked, and dismissed.
Results
Control of the Illusory Conjunction Effect
In order to confirm the presence of the illusory conjunction
effect and therefore demonstrate that the present task has the
properties described in the attention literature presented above, we
must find a higher error rate for conjunctive items than for non-
conjunctive items. We thus conducted a t test on error rates in the
first phase for the control group (i.e., WSC/coactor absent), with
the type of item (conjunctive items and nonconjunctive items) as a
within-participants factor. As in Muller et al.’s (2004) experiment,
and as expected on the basis of the conjunctive illusions literature,
the rate of nonconjunctive errors (M  10.69%, SD  11.09%)
was lower than the rate of conjunctive errors (M  58.75%, SD 
19.76%), t(11) 5.97, p .001, one tailed, proportional reduction
in error (PRE)  .76.5 These analyses have been carried out also
in Experiments 2–4, and the same effect was consistently found
(all ps  .002).
Manipulation Check
As noted earlier, participants were asked at the end of the
experiment to write down their own score from the first phase as
well as that of the coactor (i.e., the information given during the
break). The aim of this questionnaire was to confirm that partici-
pants correctly understood the score they had been given. As
reported in the Participants section, 2 participants were excluded
from the analyses because they failed to complete this information.
5 We opt here for presenting the PRE (Judd & McClelland, 1989) as an
effect size index, instead of the more often used eta squared. This does not
change the way it is calculated and interpreted, given that this change is
only dictated by mathematical formalization rules. Indeed, in mathematical
formalization, Greek letters are often supposed to be used to refer to
population values. Eta squared should thus be the true effect size in the
population, which is, by definition, a value that cannot be known in
experimental settings.
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Error Rate
Phase 1. At this stage of the experiment, presence of the
coactor was the only independent (between-participants) variable
that had been introduced. This analysis showed that participants
who were in the presence of the coactor made fewer conjunctive
errors (M  47.91%, SD  21.08%) than did those in the coactor-
absent condition (M  56.56%, SD  18.08%), t(61)  1.75,
p  .043, one tailed, PRE  .047. It should be noticed that the
same analysis on the rate of nonconjunctive error rate was not
significant, t(61)  1.
Phase 2. We have argued that the self-evaluation threat hy-
pothesis predicts a two-level pattern of performance. On the one
hand, for participants in the two DSC conditions and the control
condition (WSC/coactor absent), there is no salient self-evaluation
threat. For these three conditions, we therefore predicted a higher
rate of conjunctive errors. On the other hand, for participants in the
two USC conditions and the mere-coaction condition (WSC/
coactor present), there is a self-evaluation threat (or at least the risk
of one). Among these three conditions, we therefore predicted a
lower conjunctive error rate. Given the specificity of this predic-
tion, we treated experimental conditions as a one-way factor in
order to test this theoretical model directly with a planned com-
parison. First, the analysis of variance (ANOVA) conducted on the
rate of conjunctive errors revealed a significant condition effect,
F(5, 57)  3.017, p  .017, PRE  .21. Second, in order to test
our model, we decomposed this omnibus effect into two orthogo-
nal tests: one planned comparison testing the model and a set of
orthogonal contrasts testing the remaining variance (i.e., this set of
orthogonal contrasts should not be significant if the model fits the
data; Judd & McClelland, 1989; Keppel, 1991). The planned
comparison test was then a single-degree-of-freedom contrast
coded as “–1 1 1 1 –1 –1,” respectively associated with the
WSC/coactor-present, WSC/coactor-absent, DSC/coactor-present,
DSC/coactor-absent, USC/coactor-present, and USC/coactor-
absent conditions. The second orthogonal test was the set of
contrasts testing the residual variance. In other words: Do the
conditions within each predicted level differ from each other? This
analysis revealed that the former test—the model—was signifi-
cant, F(1, 57)  13.28, p  .001, PRE  .189, whereas the
latter—the residual—was not, F(4, 57) 1, p .92, PRE .016.6
Furthermore, as can be seen in Figure 1, the means were in the
expected direction, with the two DSC and the WSC/coactor-absent
conditions showing a higher level of conjunctive errors (which did
not differ from each other), and the two USC and the WSC/
coactor-present conditions showing a lower level (again, not dif-
ferent from each other).
Given the attentional nature of our predictions, no differences
were expected on the rate of nonconjunctive errors. The ANOVA
conducted on the nonconjunctive error rates was not significant,
F(5, 57)  1.33, p  .26, PRE  .10.
Reaction Time
One might suppose that participants in the conditions with lower
error rates were not more attentionally focused but that they simply
took more time to respond carefully. However, this possibility is
not borne out in the data. The ANOVA conducted on reaction
times for the conjunctive items of Phase 2 was not significant, F(5,
57)  1, p  .74, PRE  .046.
Discussion
First, these results appear to be in line with an attentional view
of SFI. Indeed, in the first phase, conjunctive error rate was higher
than 50% (i.e., 56.56%) in the absent condition—the relevant
6 In order to be less conservative when no effects were expected, all
residual tests presented in this article were also tested with only one degree
of freedom (Keppel, 1991). These analyses led to exactly the same con-
clusions.
Figure 1. Conjunctive error rates as a function of presence of the coactor and social comparison in Experiment
1. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. Means that do not share the same subscript are significantly
different at p  .05, one tailed t test. WSC  without social comparison; DSC  downward social comparison;
USC  upward social comparison.
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condition in the assessment of the baseline error rate—and there-
fore a dominant-response view would have predicted a higher error
rate in the presence of the coactor (Zajonc, 1980). However, and in
line with a prediction in terms of attentional focusing, the presence
of the coactor led to a lower (and not a higher) rate of conjunctive
errors in Phase 1. As can be seen in Figure 1, Phase 2 confirmed
as well the focusing effect of coaction by showing that, in the
conditions in which no social comparison was induced, the mere-
coaction condition (WSC/present coactor) entailed a significantly
lower conjunctive error rate than the control condition (WSC/
coactor absent). It is true that during Phase 2, in the coactor-absent
condition, the conjunctive error rate was lower than 50% (i.e.,
44.28%), and the dominant-response view would have been cor-
rect in predicting a lower error rate in presence of the coactor.
However, only the attentional view successfully predicted the
results in both phases.
As far as the hypothesis on self-evaluation threat is concerned,
these results appear to be in line with the prediction of two levels
of performance. A level of performance comparable to that of the
control group was predicted when self-evaluation was not threat-
ened. Indeed, both DSC conditions—those in which the positivity
of self-evaluation is satisfied—were found to be at the level of the
control condition. The second predicted level of performance is a
level with a lower conjunctive error rate than the control condition.
This level is reached in every condition in which there is a threat
or a possible threat to self-evaluation. Indeed, this level is reached
on the one hand for conditions in which there is a threat because
the performance of the participant is inferior to the target of
comparison (in both USC conditions). More important, this was
true regardless of the physical presence of the coactor, which
argues for the fact that self-evaluation threat is a critical determi-
nant of attentional focusing in this paradigm. Crucially, this
heightened level of performance is also reached in the mere-
coaction condition, in which no explicit threat exists (i.e., partic-
ipants are not inferior) but in which a potential threat still looms
because the coactor could turn out to be superior. In other words,
the mere possibility of a self-evaluation threat, rendered salient by
the presence of the coactor, produced an attentional focus. Al-
though this is not the core of our argument in the present article,
future research could study other factors, including priming, that
might affect the salience of potential USC as a means to reinforce
the idea that the representation of a potentially unfavorable com-
parison is threatening and induces attentional focusing.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, threat was induced on the basis of an inter-
personal comparison standard of performance. Indeed, knowing
the coactor’s performance introduces a standard to be reached (cf.
Seta et al., 1991), and participants in the USC realized that their
performance was below that standard. This comparison is threat-
ening for self-evaluation because the performance is not sufficient
in relative terms. Our interpretation in terms of self-evaluation
threat could be confirmed and extended if a threat induced on the
basis of another standard would also lead to attentional focusing
and thereby to a reduction in the conjunctive error rate. For
instance, comparison to a normative standard (Bandura, 1986)
should also induce self-evaluation threat. Accordingly, Experiment
2 was designed to manipulate the feedback in order to induce a
perception of good or bad performance, not on the basis of an
interpersonal comparison, but on the basis of a normative standard
well-known by students: the midpoint of a scale. Indeed, the
students who participated in these experiments have been social-
ized in a system in which grades under the midpoint of the grading
scale correspond to a “fail,” whereas grades over the midpoint
correspond to a “pass”: From the beginning of primary school,
French students are evaluated on a 0–20 scale, and they learn that
all grades below 10 imply a failure (getting worse when approach-
ing 0) and that all the grades equal or above 10 imply some success
(getting better when approaching 20).
Using a 0%–100% scale, we then expected a lower conjunctive
error rate when participants’ performance was (allegedly) below
the midpoint of the scale (namely, 35%), as compared with an
alleged performance over the midpoint of the scale (namely, 65%).
Furthermore, the presence of the coactor was again manipulated
(coactor absent, coactor present). If it is true that the mere presence
of a coactor (i.e., without any information on his or her perfor-
mance) is threatening because it makes salient another standard of
evaluation and thus raises the potential for an unfavorable com-
parison, then there should be a (potential) threat even when the
participant’s alleged performance is above the midpoint. In sum-
mary, only the condition in which the coactor is absent and
participant’s performance is above the scale midpoint is free of
self-evaluation threat: Neither normative nor interpersonal stan-
dards will cast doubt on the individual’s performance. Thus, this




Sixty psychology undergraduate students received extra course
credit for participation in what we presented as an ergonomics
study. Five participants were dropped from the analysis: 2 because
they were suspicious about the feedback and 3 because they could
not remember their score at the end of the experiment. Participants
were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions
of a design, including two between-participants independent vari-
ables. The first one was introduced at the beginning of Phase 1 and
concerned the presence of the coactor (coactor absent, coactor
present). The second one was introduced during the break between
the two phases and concerned the performance feedback (high
performance, low performance). The average participant age was
21 years old (M  21.02, SD  4.65). The majority of the
participants were women (n 49). All the participants had normal
or corrected vision.
Materials and Procedure
The materials for this experiment were exactly the same as in
the previous one. The procedure was basically the same; partici-
pants arrived either alone or two at a time and thus were either
alone in the cubicle or in the presence of a coactor. To be sure that
participants did not exchange their scores during the experiment,
the coactor was always a confederate. After the first experimental
phase, and in order to manipulate self-evaluation threat on the
normative standard, half the participants were provided bogus
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feedback stating that they had responded correctly 35% of the
time, whereas the other half were told that they had responded
correctly 65% of the time. This information appeared on the
participant’s screen during the break, after the results for Phase 1
had supposedly been computed. It is worth noting that in the




As in Experiment 1, participants had to recall their score in the
postexperimental questionnaire. In this experiment, as reported in
the Participants section, 3 participants who did not correctly recall
their scores were excluded from the analysis.
Error Rate
Phase 1. Given that presence of the coactor was the only
independent variable that was introduced in Phase 1 (participants
were either alone in the cubicle or in the presence of a coactor), a
replication of Experiment 1 should obtain a mere-coaction effect
on conjunctive error rates. A t test, with the presence of the coactor
(coactor absent, coactor present) as a between-participants vari-
able, revealed that the results replicated those of Experiment 1:
The error rate was lower in the presence of the coactor (M 
46.18%, SD  17.42%) than when participants were alone in the
cubicle (M  61.37%, SD  27.44%), t(53)  2.44, p  .009,
one tailed, PRE  .10. Again, no effect appeared when the same
analysis was performed on the nonconjunctive error rate,
t(53)  1.
Phase 2. The hypothesis in terms of self-evaluation threat
predicted a two-level pattern of conjunctive error rates, with, on
the one hand, a higher error rate for the high-performance/coactor-
absent condition and, on the other hand, a lower error rate for the
remaining conditions, all of which represented a threat or a poten-
tial threat to self-evaluation. The ANOVA conducted on the rate of
conjunctive errors revealed a significant effect, F(3, 51)  6.58,
p  .001, PRE  .28. In order to test our model, this omnibus test
was again broken down into two orthogonal tests. First, the
planned comparison for the model was the single-degree-of-
freedom contrast coded as “3 –1 –1 –1,” respectively associated
with the high-performance/coactor-absent, low-performance/
coactor-absent, high-performance/coactor-present, and low-perfor-
mance/coactor-present conditions. The second test was the test of
the residual (i.e., Do the three conditions in which we predicted
low error rates differ from each other?). This analysis revealed that
the former test—the model—was significant, F(1, 51)  19.14,
p  .001, PRE  .27, whereas the latter—the residual—was not,
F(2, 51)  1, p  .73, PRE  .012. Furthermore, as can be seen
in Figure 2, the means were in the expected direction, with the
high-performance/coactor-absent condition yielding a higher level
of conjunctive errors than the other three conditions, which did not
differ from one another.
Given the attentional nature of the proposed effects, no differ-
ence was expected on the rate of nonconjunctive errors. The
ANOVA performed on the nonconjunctive error rate was not
significant, F(3, 51)  1, p  .74, PRE  .02.
Reaction Time
Again, it might be suggested that participants in the conditions
with a lower conjunctive error rate simply took more time to
respond accurately. However, as in Experiment 1, the data did not
support this explanation. The ANOVA conducted on the reaction
times for Phase 2 conjunctive items was not significant, F(3, 51)
1.27, p  .29, PRE  .069.
Discussion
Results of the first phase confirmed that mere coaction led to
a lower conjunctive error rate in this task requiring attentional
focusing. One could infer from the rate of conjunctive errors in
the alone condition (more than 61%) that the dominant response
was not correct. Nevertheless, the effect of mere coaction
resulted in a significant decrease (and not increase) in the
conjunctive error rate. These results seem once again more
consistent with an attentional approach to the coaction effect,
notably with the distraction-conflict theory (Baron, 1986; Mul-
ler et al., 2004).
The major aim of this second experiment, however, was to
test whether the induction of self-evaluation threat via another,
less relational, standard of evaluation could lower the conjunc-
tive error rate. As expected, and as can be seen in Figure 2, the
results of this second experiment confirmed our hypothesis:
When the coactor was not present, the participants’ rate of
conjunctive errors was lower in the low-performance condition
than in the high-performance one. As soon as the coactor was
present, being reassured about the performance on the basis of
this standard was not sufficient. As mentioned above, if the
mere-coaction effect is due to uncertainty concerning a possible
USC, then reassurance about one’s performance relative to a
normative standard does not rule out this uncertainty. There-
fore, the coactor’s presence should still result in attentional
focusing and thus in a lowered conjunctive error rate. And
indeed it does: Being reassured (or not) about a normative
standard had no influence on conjunctive error rate when a
coactor was present. As in Experiment 1, when a coactor is
present, potential threat associated with the possibly higher
performance of the coactor seems to lead to a lower conjunctive
error rate. This is an important result because it supports our
general hypothesis that as long as there is an element that
suggests the possibility of an unfavorable self-evaluation, at-
tentional focus occurs.
The results of this experiment constitute another brick in the
wall of the self-evaluation threat interpretation. Moreover, they
suggest an additional hypothesis: If a threat can be induced on the
basis of a normative standard of comparison, then it must be
possible to use this normative standard to induce self-evaluation
threat in DSC, resulting in attentional focusing and the consequent
reduction in conjunctive errors.
Experiment 3
In our third experiment, the interpersonal standard of com-
parison and the normative standard were explicitly articulated
in order to test the idea that as soon as self-evaluation is
threatened on at least one of these standards, attentional focus-
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ing will be enhanced, and the conjunctive error rate will be
reduced. In this experiment, social comparison (USC, DSC)
will be articulated with the alleged level of performance (high
performance, low performance). The contribution of this exper-
iment is to demonstrate that being superior to the coactor (DSC)
is not necessarily a guarantee against self-evaluation threat.
Showing that a self-evaluation threat induction can increase
attentional focusing even in DSC would add to the strength of
our argument that self-evaluation threat induces attentional
focusing.
On the basis of the self-evaluation threat hypothesis, it can be
expected that if feedback is threatening on at least one of the
two standards, then the conjunctive error rate will decrease. It
follows that a two-level pattern of performance should be
found, with only one condition in which the conjunctive error
rate is higher, because self-evaluation is not threatened by
either type of comparison: the DSC/high-performance condi-
tion. Conversely, the conjunctive error rate should be reduced
when self-evaluation is threatened on either or both of these
standards. First, conjunctive errors should be lower when self-
evaluation is challenged by the interpersonal comparison stan-
dard (that is, in both USC conditions). Second and more inter-
estingly, a lower conjunctive error rate is also predicted in the
DSC/low-performance condition because of the threat on the
basis of the normative standard. This condition is important in
the sense that, if the rate of conjunctive error is lowered (as
expected), it would demonstrate that it is possible to find a




Sixty-two psychology undergraduate students received extra course
credit for participation in what we presented as an ergonomics study.
Eight participants were dropped from the analysis: 5 because they
were suspicious about the feedback and 3 because they could not
remember their score or the coactor’s score at the end of the experi-
ment. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four exper-
imental conditions of a design with two independent variables: the
social comparison, with two between-participants conditions (USC,
DSC); and the performance feedback, with two between-participants
conditions (high performance, low performance). The average partic-
ipant age was 20 years old (M 20.33, SD 3.35). The majority of
the participants were women (n 51). All the participants had normal
or corrected vision.
Materials and Procedure
The materials in this experiment were exactly the same as in
Experiments 1 and 2. The procedure was almost the same as in
Experiment 2, but this time, participants were always alone in the
cubicle. As in both previous studies, feedback was manipulated
during the break. As shown in Table 1, feedback patterns (partic-
ipant/coactor) were 65/50, 65/80, 35/20, and 35/50, respectively,
for the high-performance/DSC, high-performance/USC, low-per-
Figure 2. Rate of conjunctive errors as a function of the presence of the coactor and bogus feedback in
Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. Means that do not share the same subscript are
significantly different at p  .05, one tailed t test.
Table 1
Summary of Feedback Patterns Given to Participants,
Depending on Alleged Performance and Direction of Social
Comparison in Experiment 3
Condition Bad performance Good performance
USC Self: 35% Self: 65%
Coactor: 50% Coactor: 80%
DSC Self: 35% Self: 65%
Coactor: 20% Coactor: 50%
Note. USC  upward social comparison; DSC  downward social
comparison.
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formance/DSC, and low-performance/USC conditions. The exper-
imenter gave participants information about the scores during the
break by using the following strategy: First, he gave them the
coactor’s score, and then he said, “Oh no, sorry, this is the other
participant’s score. Your score is . . . ”
Results
Manipulation Check
As in Experiments 1 and 2, participants had to recall Phase 1 scores
in a postexperimental questionnaire. In this experiment, as reported in
the Participants section, 3 participants who had not correctly recalled
these two scores were excluded from the analyses.
Error Rate7
We predicted a two-level pattern of conjunctive error rates,
with, on the one hand, a higher error rate for the high-performance/
DSC condition, which posed no evaluative threat and, on the other
hand, a lower error rate for the remaining conditions, each of
which entailed some form of threat. The ANOVA conducted on
the rate of conjunctive errors revealed a significant effect, F(3,
50)  3.55, p  .021, PRE  .175. In order to test our model, this
omnibus test was again broken down into two orthogonal tests.
First, the planned comparison for the model was the single-degree-
of-freedom contrast, coded as “3 –1 –1 –1”, respectively associ-
ated with the high-performance/DSC, low-performance/DSC,
high-performance/USC, and low-performance/USC conditions.
The second test was the test of the residual (i.e., Do the three
conditions in which conjunctive errors are predicted to be low
differ from each other?). This analysis revealed that the former
test—the model—was significant, F(1, 50)  10.10, p  .002,
PRE .168, whereas the latter—the residual—was not, F(2, 50) 1,
p  .70, PRE  .014. Furthermore, as can be seen in Figure 3, the
means were in the expected direction, with the high-performance/
DSC producing a higher rate of conjunctive errors than the other three
conditions (which did not differ from each other).
As before, given the attentional nature of the proposed dynam-
ics, no difference was expected on the rate of nonconjunctive
errors. The ANOVA performed on the nonconjunctive error rate
was not significant, F(3, 50)  1.22, p  .31, PRE  .068.
Reaction Time
Again, the ANOVA conducted on the reaction time for conjunc-
tive items in Phase 2 was not significant, F(3, 50)  1, p  .79,
PRE .020, and therefore offers no alternative explanation for the
pattern of results.
Discussion
Like Experiment 2, this study showed that as soon as self-
evaluation regarding performance is threatened, the rate of con-
junctive errors is lowered. Indeed, as illustrated in Figure 3, these
results showed that as long as one of the two evaluation standards
introduces a threat, the illusory conjunction rate is decreased.
These results also replicated the difference found in Experiment 1
between USC and DSC when the coactor was not physically
present. Moreover, and even more interestingly, this experiment
illustrates that even participants in DSC can be led to reduce their
conjunctive error rate if a self-evaluation threat on the basis of a
normative standard of comparison is introduced: Participants in the
“35/20” condition were superior to their target of comparison, but
the fact that their (alleged) performance was low relative to the
normative standard, in itself, led to a lower rate of conjunctive
errors. This effect is crucial because it demonstrates that being
superior to the coactor is not sufficient for participants to be
7 In Experiments 3 and 4, the only purpose of the first phase was to
reproduce the same experimental setting, as in Experiments 1 and 2, and to
create an excuse to provide feedback; no manipulation was introduced at
this point, and therefore no analysis is presented for Phase 1. However, we
did run analyses that showed no biased random assignment to the different
conditions.
Figure 3. Rate of conjunctive errors as a function of bogus feedback and social comparison in Experiment 3.
Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. Means that do not share the same subscript are significantly
different at p  .05, one tailed t test. DSC  downward social comparison; USC  upward social comparison.
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satisfied with their performance, and, by virtue of that demonstra-
tion, it reinforces the self-evaluation threat hypothesis. It is also
worth noting that these results do not involve a ranking of these
standards in order of their importance. Indeed, the results of both
Experiments 2 and 3 suggest that introducing a self-evaluation
threat on either one of these two standards is sufficient to lower the
rate of errors on conjunctive items.
Finally, if Experiment 3 introduced self-evaluation threat in
DSC, then a symmetric test of the present self-evaluation threat
hypothesis would be to remove the threat from USC in order to see
whether this could lower attentional focusing. This idea is devel-
oped in the next experiment.
Experiment 4
The aim of this experiment was to test the possibility of removing
the impact of interpersonal USC by attenuating—instead of induc-
ing—the self-evaluation threat inherent to this kind of comparison.
The reasoning here was based on work that has demonstrated that
individuals infer their position in the larger group from interpersonal
comparison (e.g., Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 1995; Kulik & Gump,
1997). In other words, if, for instance, Josh’s performance is worse
than Greg’s, then it must be bad in general. Hence, self-evaluation
threat could be manipulated under interpersonal USC by manipulating
this inference. Therefore, the basic idea was to introduce the same
threat used in Experiment 3 by telling participants that their perfor-
mance was both low and inferior to that of the coactor. They were thus
provided feedback stating that they had responded correctly only 35%
of the time, whereas the coactor had responded correctly 50% of the
time (the worst situation given that neither of the previously studied
standards are reached). However, one half the participants was told
that 35% is actually a good score, compared with how people usually
perform on this task. The other half was told nothing other than their
performance and that of the coactor. If USC threatens participants in
their self-evaluation because of an inference about the ranking of their
performance, relative to a larger population, then this threat should be
removed when participants are reassured about their standing within
that population. We predicted that giving participants such an assur-
ance should lead them to commit more conjunctive errors than par-
ticipants in the regular USC condition.
Method
Participants and Design
Twenty-four psychology undergraduate students received extra
course credit for participation in what we presented simply as a
social psychology experiment. Two participants were dropped
from the analysis because they could not remember their score or
the coactor’s at the end of the experiment. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of the two conditions (default, reas-
sured). The average participant age was 19 years (M  19.27,
SD  1.69). The majority of the participants were women (n 
17). All the participants had normal or corrected vision.
Materials
The materials of this experiment were the same as in the previous
experiments. The only difference was that the postexperimental ques-
tionnaire asked participants how they estimated their performance
compared with all other participants on this type of task. Responses
were collected on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (very much below the
average) to 7 (very much above the average).
Procedure
The procedure was approximately the same as for Experiment 3.
The experiment was clearly presented as a study on the impact of
social comparison feedback on performance. By doing so, participants
were not surprised to be given their performance (i.e., 35%), that of
the coactor (i.e., 50%), and, for half of them (i.e., in the reassured
condition), to be told “Hmm, 35% correct responses . . . in compari-
son to how people usually perform in this task, that’s really good!”
The performance feedback was displayed during the break on the
computer screen just before the above experimental induction.
Results
Manipulation Check
As in our other experiments, participants had to recall their and
the coactor’s scores in the postexperimental questionnaire. In this
experiment, 2 participants were excluded from the analysis given
that they did not recall these two scores correctly. Participants
were also asked to evaluate their performance in comparison to the
population. As expected, participants in the reassured condition
evaluated their performance more positively (M  3.72, SD 
0.78) than participants in the default condition (M  2.72, SD 
0.47), t(20)  3.62, p  .002, PRE  .40. Moreover, a t test
against the midpoint (namely, 4  average) revealed that partici-
pants in the default condition saw their performance as below
average, t(20)  6.53, p  .001, which was not the case for
participants in the reassured condition, t(20)  1.40, p  .18.
Error Rate
As expected, during the second phase, a higher conjunctive error
rate was found in the reassured condition (M  56%, SD 
25.94%) than in the default condition (M  26%, SD  22.39%),
t(20)  2.81, p  .005, one tailed, PRE  .28. As previously, the
t test conducted on the nonconjunctive error rate did not show a
significant difference, t(20)  1, p  .69, PRE  .008.
Reaction Time
Again, the difference on the reaction times for Phase 2 conjunc-
tive items was not significant, t(20)  1.44, p  .16, PRE  .093.
Discussion
This experiment studied the possibility of removing the self-
evaluation threat inherent to interpersonal USC. Threat was min-
imized for half the participants by suggesting that their perfor-
mance, though lower than the coactor’s, was actually quite good
compared with that of the general population. Results confirmed
that removing self-evaluation threat by providing a more relevant
target of comparison—the population as a whole—led participants
to commit a higher rate of conjunctive errors, even in USC. In
other words, it is possible to reduce self-evaluation threat—that is,
to reassure participants—even when performance is unsatisfactory
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on both the interpersonal and the normative standards. This is an
important result because, in a way that is symmetric to Experiment
3, the present experiment shows that what is crucial for inducing
attentional focus is not the type of interpersonal social comparison
that people make but rather the self-evaluation threat that is asso-
ciated with that social comparison.
An ad interim conclusion on the basis of the results obtained
with the above four experiments is that every time participants’
self-evaluation was threatened, we observed an attentional focus
indicated by a lower conjunctive error rate than conditions imply-
ing no self-evaluation threat. However, in the task consistently
used in the four experiments, self-evaluation threat always in-
duced—as predicted—a lower conjunctive error rate, which in this
task corresponds to a better performance and therefore to a social
facilitation effect. The uniformity of this result may give way to a
serious objection: The lower conjunctive error rate may not be a
specific effect of attentional focus but a generic social facilitation
effect due to an increase in effort. Indeed, one might argue that not
only in the USC conditions but also in the mere-coaction condi-
tions or when participants are told that they performed below the
midpoint, we increased the participants’ level of self-focused at-
tention, thereby producing greater effort in order to match the
standard (cf. Carver & Scheier, 1981) and, in turn, better perfor-
mance (social facilitation). Two elements favor our attentional
focus explanation over the alternative self-focus one. First, in-
creased performance appeared only on conjunctive items, and not
on nonconjunctive ones, suggesting a specific attentional-focus-
restriction-to-central-cues process rather than a generic self-focus-
increased-effort process, which should predict a facilitation effect
also on the nonconjunctive items because the display time does not
allow participants to consciously recognize the two kinds of items.
Second, no experimental effects were observed on reaction times,
in any of the four experiments, suggesting that participants did not
“try harder” to find out the good answer in the critical conditions.
However, the above two elements provide only circumstantial
evidence and render the alternative explanation less plausible but
not impossible. In order to rule it out, we designed Experiment 5,
which reproduced two critical conditions of Experiment 1 (USC
and DSC), but it involved a perceptual task in which the effort and
attentional views would make clearly different predictions.
Experiment 5
The aim of this last experiment was to reproduce two critical
conditions of Experiment 1 (USC and DSC) using a task that
allows us to test whether self-evaluation threat increases atten-
tional focusing and not performance per se. This task was concep-
tually similar to the one used by Geen (1976), which had partic-
ipants perform a memory task. In addition to central cues (i.e., the
material to be learned), they were provided with peripheral cues
that could help (relevant cues, in Geen’s terms) or harm (irrelevant
cues) their performance. Thus, it was a task in which allocation of
attention to peripheral cues would induce differential performance
as a function of their relevance. Interestingly for our contention,
Geen found, particularly for anxious participants, that the presence
of the experimenter (a threatening evaluative presence) led partic-
ipants to use less peripheral cues (to focus their attention only on
central cues) than did participants in an alone-control condition. In
other words, the experimenter’s presence resulted in attentional
focusing as indicated by the disappearance of the cueing effect
(higher performance with relevant than with nonrelevant cues).
Experiment 5 adopted the same logic and presented the partic-
ipants with a perceptual task often used in attentional studies (in
order to enable a clearer attentional interpretation), which contains
both helpful or harmful peripheral cues (from now on, we rather
call them valid versus invalid peripheral cues to be consistent with
the vast majority of the literature on attention; e.g., Posner, Snyder,
& Davidson, 1980). Within this visual detection task, one has to
locate a target, the letter O, among three Qs as quickly as possible.
Such a situation is known to require the participant to scan each
letter that is presented until the target is found, a kind of search that
is referred to as a serial search (Treisman, 1988, 1998, see also
Briand, 1998). In addition, a cue is provided before these measure
displays are presented. Hence, a simple black dot in an otherwise
blank screen is shown in what is called “orienting” displays: For
some trials, this dot, the cue, indicates in advance the target’s
location (cf. Figure 4). Because the participant’s attention is at-
tracted by this cue, the serial search starts (and actually finishes) on
the target’s location. As a consequence, the reaction time is faster.
This kind of cue is referred to as a valid cue. In contrast, for some
trials, the cue is not located where the target will appear but in the
location of one of the Qs. In this case, attention is attracted toward
the “wrong” location, and reaction time becomes slower. This kind
of cue will therefore be referred to as an invalid cue. Note that
invalid cues should only lower reaction times slightly because
without any cue, the serial search would only have one chance out
of four to start in the right location against zero chances out of four
when attention is attracted by the invalid cue.
The attentional literature has repeatedly shown that in a reaction
time paradigm, as the one we use, participants are faster to detect
targets preceded by valid cues than by invalid ones (Briand, 1998;
Briand & Klein, 1987; Posner et al., 1980).8 Thus, it appears that
such orienting cues do attract attention. The replicability of this
effect in our experimental setting will be tested in a pilot study. It
is worth noting that this attentional orientation is said to be
exogenous because it is a bottom-up process in which the mere
presence of an object (a black dot in the present experiment), in an
otherwise blank screen, attracts attention. It does not rely on any
intention or strategic decision on the part of individuals (cf.
Briand, 1998; Briand & Klein, 1987). This is important for our
contention because it implies that participants cannot consciously
decide not to use these cues.
What would be the influence of being inferior to the coactor
(USC)? The simplest prediction is the one in terms of self-focus
and increased effort to match standards: Reaction time should be
faster under USC, regardless of the validity of the cue. In a 2
(social comparison: DSC, USC)  2 (cue validity: valid, invalid)
design, the effort view would then predict a social comparison
main effect. However, a self-evaluation threat approach would
predict more attentional focusing (attention to central cues and
inhibition of peripheral cues) under USC than under DSC, and
therefore an interaction effect. Why? Let us bear in mind that in the
8 It should be noted that this would be true only for short to modest
stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA). Indeed, longer SOA could induce an
inhibition of return effect, with reaction time being faster after invalid than
after valid cues (Posner & Cohen, 1984).
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present task, the (measure) displays presenting the O and the Qs
are the central cues; the orienting displays, those displaying the
dot, are peripheral cues because they are not necessary to perform
the task.9 Thus, if self-evaluation threat leads to attentional focus-
ing, peripheral cues should be more disregarded under USC than
under DSC, and therefore the cueing effect (faster reaction times
after valid than after invalid cues) should be smaller under USC
than under DSC, that is, a Social Comparison  Cues Validity
interaction effect.
A corollary of the above hypothesis is that because valid cues
should be more disregarded under USC than under DSC, reaction
time after valid cues should be slower under USC than under DSC,
as helpful information is ignored. This is an important corollary, as
reaction time after valid cues is a highly diagnostic measure to
disentangle increase in effort from increase in attentional focusing.
Indeed, it is possible to oppose the two alternative views: Slower
reaction times are predicted by the attentional focusing view (an
inhibition effect), whereas faster reaction times are predicted by
the effort view (a facilitation effect). As far as reaction time after
invalid cues is concerned, it is a nondiagnostic measure because
both views predict a faster reaction time under USC than under
DSC—the effort view because of an increase in effort regardless of
the type of cue and the attentional focusing view because the
impairing peripheral information is ignored (although, as noted
above, impairment of invalid cues only lowers the probability to




Forty psychology undergraduates volunteered in an experiment
presented as a study on visual perception. Participants were ran-
domly assigned to one of the two conditions (social comparison:
DSC, USC). The average age was 20 years old (M  20.43, SD 
1.82). The majority of the participants were women (n  31). All
the participants had normal or corrected vision.
Materials and Procedure
As for Experiment 1, participants were welcomed at the same
time as the confederate coactor. They were both seated in a
cubicle, and the experimenter provided the same instructions as in
the coactor-present conditions of Experiment 1. Participants were
seated 1 m from a 17 in. (43-cm) Samsung 75 MHz monitor.
As depicted in Figure 4, the sequence was always as follows: a
1,000-ms fixation point, a 30-ms orienting display, and a measure
display. These last displays stayed on the screen until participants
responded. Measure displays had four black letters, which were
always one O and three Qs. These letters were in Arial font and
were presented on the same locations as the preceding orienting
displays (i.e., top left, top right, bottom left, and bottom right).
Each of the letters was presented at an angular distance of 6.78°
from the fixation point. We created four of these items by having
the O appearing once in each location. The participant’s task was
to indicate the location of the target “as QUICKLY and as care-
fully as possible” (as written on the screen). In order to answer,
participants were instructed to use the numerical keyboard with 4,
6, 1, and 3, respectively, for the top left, top right, bottom left, and
bottom right locations.
A fundamental aspect of the study was that each measure
display (“O among Q”) was preceded by an orienting display: A
black dot presented in one of the four locations where the target,
the O, could appear afterward. More important, location of the
orienting cues could be either the one of the O target (i.e., a valid
cue, 50% of the trials) or the one of a Q (i.e., an invalid cue, 50%
of the trials). This distribution ensures that orienting cues were
only peripheral cues (see Footnote 9). This manipulation consti-
tutes the second, within-participants, independent variable.
Participants first underwent 15 practice trials. Then during the
first experimental phase, they were exposed to 72 items (36 valid
cues and 36 invalid cues). The order of presentation was random-
ized by the software (E-Prime; Psychology Software Tools, Inc.,
Pittsburgh, PA). Once the first phase was over, the computer
provided participants with a measure of performance. This mea-
sure was said to be based on a too-complex calculation to be
explained but was simplified to a score on a 100-point scale.
Participants always received a score of 65 out of 100 while the
coactor’s performance was manipulated and was either 50 or 80,
respectively, for the DSC and USC conditions. After this bogus
feedback, participants moved to the second experimental phase,
with again 72 items (36 invalid cues and 36 valid cues). After this
last experimental phase, participants filled out an open-ended
question for which they had to recall their alleged performance in
the first phase. Moreover, they were to evaluate their own perfor-
mance by placing a tick mark on a 10-cm long nongraded scale,
with endpoints labeled very bad performance (0 cm) and very good
performance (10 cm). Their answer was later coded into the
distance in centimeters from the very bad performance anchor; a
higher number thus means a better evaluation of performance.
After doing this, they answered the same two questions (i.e., recall
and evaluation) with reference to the coactor’s performance. Fi-
nally, participants were thoroughly debriefed, thanked, and dis-
missed.
Dependent Variable
First, reaction times inferior to 300 ms and superior to 3,000 ms
were replaced, respectively, with 300 ms and 3,000 ms (Bargh &
Chartrand, 2000). Then, as a dependent variable, we used log-
transformed reaction time for correctly answered (M 99%) items
9 We realize that there could be ground for disagreement on the periph-
erality of orienting displays, for instance, if valid cues indicated the correct
location most of the time. If they did, then they could be said to be central
to adequate performance. To prevent this ambiguity, the experiment was
designed so that half of the trials were valid and half invalid.
Figure 4. Items presentation schema in Experiment 5.
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(means and standard deviations are, however, presented in milli-
seconds).
Pilot Study
In order to ensure that the task we had designed did in fact
produce the usual cueing effect (slower reaction time when pro-
vided an invalid than a valid orienting cue; e.g., Briand, 1998), we
ran a pilot study with participants alone in the cubicle (n  11).
Results revealed that log-transformed reaction time for correctly
answered items was slower for invalid (M  542, SD  68) than




We first checked that each participant recalled correctly his or
her alleged performance. Everyone did. We also asked them to
evaluate their performance and the coactor’s on a very sensitive
measurement scale. Results on this measure confirmed that par-
ticipants under USC evaluated their performance (M 4.85, SD
1.38) less positively than the coactor’s (M  7.49, SD  1.05),
t(38)  8.38, p  .001, PRE  .65, whereas participants under
DSC evaluated their performance (M  5.73, SD  1.01) more
positively than that of the coactor (M  4.59, SD  0.96), t(38) 
3.62, p  .001, PRE  .26.
Reaction Time
If, as we argued, self-evaluation threat induced by USC leads to
attentional focusing, the cueing effect should be smaller under
USC than under DSC (i.e., a Social Comparison  Cues Validity
interaction). Conversely, if USC leads to self-focus and more
effort, then faster reaction time should be found under USC re-
gardless of cues validity (i.e., a social comparison main effect). To
contrast these two predictions, we conducted a 2 (social compar-
ison: DSC, USC) 2 (cues validity: invalid, valid) ANOVA, with
the first factor varying between participants and the second one
within them.
This ANOVA only revealed the expected Social Comparison 
Orienting Cue Validity interaction, F(1, 38)  4.46, p  .041,
PRE  .10 (all other ps  .127): The cueing effect was smaller
under USC than under DSC. It is interesting to note that, as can be
seen in Table 2, the social comparison main effect seemed to be in
the opposite direction of what would be expected if USC simply
induced an increase in effort to reach standards, although this
effect was not significant ( p  .13).
Discussion
The task used for this experiment was designed to make a clear
distinction between increased attentional focusing and increased
effort. An increase in effort was expected to induce a better
performance (i.e., faster reaction times) regardless of cue validity,
whereas an increase in attentional focusing was expected to reduce
the cueing effect. This cueing effect was induced by manipulating
(peripheral) cue validity and took the form of faster reaction times
after valid cues than after invalid cues (see the Pilot Study section).
Our results illustrate that self-evaluation threat, under the form
of USC, did not quicken reaction times (if anything, USC partic-
ipants were slower) but led to a reduction—and actually to the
disappearance—of the cueing effect. This indicates a reduction in
the attention allocated to peripheral cues, or, in other words, an
increase in attentional focusing. Furthermore, as can be seen in
Table 2, results for the reaction time after the valid cues clearly
favored the attentional focusing view given that USC participants
used significantly less helpful (valid) information as compared
with the DSC condition. Thus, it appears that attentional focusing
can sometimes lead an individual to neglect helpful pieces of
information, leading to an inhibition of performance (here, slower
reaction times). Thus, it is confirmed that self-evaluation threat (in
this experiment operationalized with a USC) does indeed produce
an attentional focus on the central cues of the task at hand.
General Discussion
Our general contention is that self-evaluation threat increases
attentional focusing. Studied in the context of coaction effects, it
leads us to predict that the presence of a coactor increases atten-
tional focusing whenever she or he represents a self-evaluation
threat. This claim led us to deal with two questions relative to the
coaction effect: first, the question concerning the type of effect
(dominant response vs. attentional focusing) elicited by coaction
(the “what” question) and, second, the conditions under which
coaction has a focusing effect (the “why” question).
The Attentional Focusing Effect of Coaction
As far as the first question is concerned, we distinguished
between an attentional view (Baron, 1986; Geen, 1989; Muller et
al., 2004) and the dominant response view (Zajonc, 1965). The
former view predicts more attentional focusing (only central but
not peripheral cues are processed) in coaction than alone. In our
first perceptual task, attentional focusing was indicated by lower
conjunctive error rates. Therefore, according to the attentional
view, rates of conjunctive error should be lower in a condition of
coaction. The latter view predicts that coaction leads to better
performance when the dominant response is correct (lower con-
junctive error rates) and lower performance when it is incorrect
(higher conjunctive error rates). The results obtained with this task
appear to be in line with the attentional view because mere coac-
tion always decreased conjunctive error rates (three times in the
Table 2
Mean Reaction Time as a Function of Social Comparison and




M SD M SD
Valid 514a 44.62 567b 84.53
Invalid 534c 46.30 561b,c 93.28
Note. Means sharing the same subscript within a row or column do not
differ significantly at p  .05 (one tailed). USC  upward social compar-
ison; DSC  downward social comparison.
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present article; see also Muller et al., 2004), regardless of the
correctness of the dominant response. Indeed, in Phase 1 of both
Experiments 1 and 2, the presence of a coactor decreased conjunc-
tive errors even though the dominant response was incorrect in the
alone condition, as indicated by conjunctive error rates that were
higher than 50% (Zajonc, 1980). The robustness of this effect is
noteworthy, since Bond and Titus’ (1983) meta-analysis revealed
that, in the broader area of SFI effects, it is quite difficult to find
evidence of social facilitation on accuracy, and this measure was
precisely a measure of accuracy. Moreover, it has frequently been
noted that studies in the SFI domain often report interaction effects
between the presence of other and task type, but very seldom
simple effects of facilitation or inhibition (cf. Baron et al., 1978;
Manstead & Semin, 1980; Sanders & Baron, 1975). Therefore, the
specific kind of task we used in conjunction with the robustness of
our effects concur to suggest that the presence of a coactor does
increase attentional focusing.
The Focusing Effect of Self-Evaluation Threat
The second question is concerned with why a coactor’s presence
would consume attentional resources and thus induce attentional
focusing. Previous work suggested that it is because a coactor is
regarded as a source of social comparison information that is
useful for self-evaluation (Baron, 1986; Muller et al., 2004; Sand-
ers et al. 1978). We extended this view by suggesting that it is not
the coactor’s presence per se that is critical but the self-evaluation
threat associated with this presence. The reasoning behind this
claim is that a coactor’s performance is a standard against which
one can evaluate his or her performance, and concern about not
reaching this standard is known to consume attentional resources
under the form of ruminative thoughts (Koole et al., 1999). Note
that this approach would explain why, in earlier work, a coactor’s
presence did not always lead to coaction effects. More precisely,
coaction effects are not found when the coactor is working on a
different task (Sanders et al., 1978) or when the coactor is inferior
to participants (Huguet et al., 1999; Muller et al., 2004; Seta,
1982).
If the coaction effect on attentional focusing observed here and
in previous work is due to self-evaluation threat, then four addi-
tional consequences should follow. First, USC should be threat-
ening and should induce attentional focusing even when the coac-
tor is not physically present. Second, self-evaluation threat and the
associated attentional focusing should be induced also when per-
formance is dissatisfying as compared with a normative standard
(namely, the midpoint of an evaluative scale). Furthermore, being
reassured in terms of this normative standard should not be always
sufficient to remove self-evaluation threat because the presence of
a coactor makes salient the risk of being inferior to him or her.
Third, if self-evaluation threat is truly critical, then it should be
possible to induce an attentional focusing effect in DSC by creat-
ing a self-evaluation threat on the basis of the normative standard.
Fourth and symmetrically, if self-evaluation threat is critical, then
the focusing effect found in USC could be removed by removing
self-evaluation threat. Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively,
were designed to address these predictions.
Experiment 1 supported the first of these predictions by showing
that a reduction in conjunctive errors was found not only in mere
coaction and coaction with USC (see also Muller et al., 2004,
Experiment 1) but also when the coactor was not physically
present but was thought to be superior to the participants. Thus in
our view, regardless of whether the coactor is present, the knowl-
edge of another’s superior performance is enough to set the stan-
dard of performance evaluation at the level of the other’s perfor-
mance and thus highlight the fact that one’s own performance is
insufficient compared with the standard. This self-evaluation
threat, in turn, induces attentional focusing. Mere coaction with no
knowledge of the coactor’s results also represents a (potential)
self-evaluation threat because the coactor could turn out to be
superior. In contrast, the absence of self-evaluation threat in the
two DSC conditions led participants to commit conjunctive errors
at a level similar to the control condition, in which the individual
worked alone.
Experiment 2 tested the second point presented above and
showed that an increase in attentional focusing (i.e., a decrease in
conjunctive errors) can be induced even by reference to a nonre-
lational standard. An alleged performance of 35% of good re-
sponses can be threatening because it highlights the fact that the
performance level is not high enough to reach the normative
standard used to evaluate performance, in this case the midpoint of
the evaluation scale (the most widely used standard in our partic-
ipants’ education system). In addition, the self-evaluation threat
account of the coaction effect implies that being reassured about
that normative standard should not be sufficient once a coactor is
present because his or her presence renders salient the possibility
of not matching another available standard: his or her performance.
We thus predicted that the only condition with a higher conjunc-
tive error rate should be the condition with an alleged high per-
formance, but without the presence of the coactor. In line with this
reasoning, results showed that, without coaction, a (bogus) perfor-
mance of 35% induced a lower conjunctive error rate than a
(bogus) performance of 65%. Results also showed that when the
coactor was present, the conjunctive error rate was lower even in
the 65% condition. In other words, even when performance is
positively evaluated on a normative standard, the potential supe-
riority of the coactor, or, said differently, self-evaluation threat,
induces attentional focusing.
Our reasoning so far was that DSC was reassuring because it
does not threaten self-evaluation. However, as mentioned in the
third point presented above, if it is true that self-evaluation threat
is truly critical, then it should be possible to increase attentional
focusing in DSC by introducing a self-evaluation threat on another
available standard. It followed that if both standards are manipu-
lated at the same time (i.e., interpersonal comparison and the
comparison to the midpoint of the scale), as we did in Experiment
3, then only one condition should bring less attentional focusing,
namely, the condition in which performance was satisfying on both
standards: the DSC/high-performance condition. In the other three
conditions, self-evaluation threat on one or the other (or both)
standards should lead to attentional focusing. This was exactly
what was found. It is interesting to note that the DSC conditions
showed that, when self-evaluation threat is induced on a normative
standard (35% on the evaluation scale), the conjunctive error rate
decreased, as compared with the no-threat condition (DSC/65%),
actually reaching the same level as the USC conditions. This result
brings support to the interpretation put forward in Experiment 1,
claiming that DSC reduces the coaction effect because a favorable
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comparison reduces the self-evaluation threat associated to coac-
tion.
Finally, the aim of Experiment 4 was to demonstrate that atten-
tional focusing could be decreased in USC by reassuring partici-
pants in terms of self-evaluation. In this experiment, all partici-
pants were potentially highly threatened: Not only did they receive
low-performance feedback (35%), but they were also inferior to
the coactor (USC). However, half of them were told that, in this
task, 35% was a very good performance compared with the rest of
the population. Being reassured in terms of self-evaluation by
providing information at a higher level of comparison was sup-
posed to decrease attentional focusing (and probably designate the
coactor as a “genius”; cf. Alicke, LoSchiavo, Zerbst, & Zhang,
1997). In line with this reasoning, this procedure led to a conjunc-
tive error rate significantly higher as compared with the default
condition. To summarize, this series of four studies showed that
the expected outcome (attentional focusing) is consistently in-
duced by situations in which some aspect related to self-evaluation
does not meet the standards (or what we referred to as self-
evaluation threat), independently from the direction of social com-
parison.
It is worth noting that self-evaluation threat, although central to
our contention, was never measured in the present research. Con-
sistent with Sigall and Mills’ (1998) advice, that “measures of
manipulation checks and mediators are very useful [. . . ], but if no
plausible alternative explanations exist, data from such measures
are not needed” (p. 218), we chose instead to dismiss experimen-
tally the alternative accounts for our results (see also the Increased
Attentional Focusing or Increased Performance? section). More-
over, there are important difficulties inherent to measuring threat
in general and self-evaluative threat in particular. Indeed, one
could think of designing self-report measures to this effect; how-
ever, because these measures are open to control and self-
presentation concerns, they are often difficult to interpret (e.g.,
Muller & Butera, 2004). If future research is to address the issue
of measurement of self-evaluation threat, then two (complemen-
tary) ways to deal with this problem may be in order. The first
could be to design implicit measures assessing the accessibility of
thoughts related to self-evaluative threat (see, for instance, Koole
et al., 1999). The second one could be to rely on specific physio-
logical measures known to be related to feeling of evaluative
threat, for instance, the finger pulse volume (Allred & Smith,
1989; Smith, Houston, & Zurawski, 1984).
Increased Attentional Focusing or Increased
Performance?
Although the series of experiments described above showed that
the specific predictions stemming from the general self-evaluation
threat hypothesis were supported, the specificity of the task used
does not allow us to rule out an alternative explanation: The lower
conjunction error rate could be due, not as predicted to attentional
focusing, to an increase in effort because of the higher salience of
standards in self-focusing situations. Experiment 5 thus tested the
difference between USC and DSC conditions observed in Exper-
iment 1 with a task that dissociates attentional focusing from
performance. Results showed that the USC condition, as compared
with the DSC condition, indeed induced a focusing effect revealed
by the reduction (even the elimination) of a cueing effect normally
caused by the processing of peripheral cues. Additionally, we
found that the usefulness of valid peripheral cues was lower under
USC than under DSC, making USC participants slower than DSC
ones on these items. In other words, the above results supported
the hypothesis that self-evaluation threat induces attentional fo-
cusing, which, in turn, facilitates performance in tasks in which
ignoring the peripheral cues increases performance (as in the first
four experiments) and inhibits performance in tasks in which
ignoring the peripheral cues decreases performance (as for valid
cues in Experiment 5).
An unquestionable contribution of Zajonc’s (1965) theory
has been to underline that one must be careful about the
characteristics of the task at hand. These characteristics could
explain why the presence of a coactor sometimes helps and
sometimes hurts performance (Zajonc, 1965). Once the task at
hand is considered closely, apparent contradictions could be
resolved. To take only a few examples, one could think that the
results of our first four experiments are in contradiction with
results found in social influence research. Indeed, researchers
have shown that when participants were confronted with a
superior, more powerful source of influence (a majority; Butera,
Mugny, Legrenzi, & Pe´rez, 1996), or when they had a threat-
ening (i.e., competitive) relationship with the coactor (Butera &
Mugny, 1995), confirmation bias in inductive reasoning was
increased. One could interpret these results as an inhibition
effect of self-evaluation threat, contrary to the facilitation effect
found in Experiments 1– 4. However, confirmation bias is
known to be increased by the exclusive focus on one’s own
hypothesis (Butera & Buchs, 2005); thus, the above results are
compatible with the present work in that they show that self-
evaluation threat led to a form of attentional focusing.
One could also think that our results are in contradiction with
the stereotype threat literature (e.g., Steele & Aronson, 1995).
Within this field, threat is supposed to inhibit performance. But
again, what are the tasks at hand? Usually, a fairly complicated
task for which a lot of information has to be put together—in other
words, tasks for which attentional focusing should impair and not
help performance. With such tasks, we would predict that self-
evaluation threat (for instance USC) should decrease performance.
And indeed, in a stereotype threat study using a mathematics task,
Marx, Stapel, and Muller (2005) found in the same experiment
decreased performance under stereotype threat and under interper-
sonal USC. Given that reasoning or mathematics tasks are difficult
to interpret in terms of attentional processing, these are just ten-
tative extensions of the self-evaluation threat hypothesis at this
point. However, in future research, it would certainly be interesting
to show that other kinds of threat, like stereotype threat, increase
attentional focusing.
Forty years after the publication of Zajonc’s (1965) seminal
article, we would reiterate that task characteristics must be studied
carefully in order to understand the impact of social factors on
people’s information processing. We would add to Zajonc’s advice
that using well-known cognitive tasks could help with this matter
and that this could contribute to cognitive psychology as well by
showing that social factors can have a serious impact on effects
that are often believed to be purely perceptual.
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